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Case No. 990793-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for obstruction of justice, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306(1 )(b-c), (2) (1999). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the State present sufficient evidence to establish the corpus delicti of 
obstructing justice independent of defendant's extrajudicial post-crime admissions? 
Standard of Review: "[T]he determination of whether the corpus delicti rule has 
been satisfied is a question of law, and we give no deference to the trial court's ruling, but 
review it under a correctness standard." State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183,1186 (Utah App. 
1994). See also State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991). 
Issue 2: Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's conviction for obstruction 
ofjustice? 
Standard of Review: In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a 
conviction, an appellate court views "'the evidence and all inferences which maybe drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury.'" State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 
343 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). An appellate 
court will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence "only when the evidence is so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime." Id. (citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statute is applicable to the issue on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306. Obstructing Justice. 
(1) A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent to hinder, prevent, or delay 
the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another 
for the commission of a crime, he: 
(b) harbors or conceals the offender; 
(c) provides the offender a weapon, transportation, disguise, or other 
means for avoiding discovery or apprehension; [or] 
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any physical evidence that might aid 
in the discovery, apprehension, or conviction of the person; 
(2) An offense under Subsections (1 )(a) through (f) is a class B misdemeanor, 
unless the actor knows that the offender committed a capital offense or a 
felony of the first degree, in which case the offense is a second degree felony. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in an amended information, dated December 15, 1998, with 
one count of second degree felony obstructing justice (R. 5, 14). At trial, defendant moved 
to dismiss the charge at the end of the State's case-in-chief on the ground that the State 
presented insufficient evidence to prove the corpus delicti independent of defendant's 
statements (R. 211:189-91). The trial court denied the motion, finding that the State did 
adduce sufficient independent corroborative evidence of the corpus delicti (R. 211:196-99). 
The jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 105-07). In rendering its verdict, the jury 
unanimously found that defendant had obstructed justice in two ways: 1) defendant "harbored 
or concealed the offender," and 2) defendant had "provided the offender with a weapon, 
transportation, disguise, or other means for avoiding discovery or apprehension" (R. 105-06). 
Defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment on August 2, 1999 (R. 142). The trial 
court denied the motion on September 2, 1999, just before imposing sentence (R. 160; R. 
213:5). The trial court sentenced defendant to one to fifteen years in prison and fined her 
$ 1,000 (R. 167-69). The court suspended the prison term and placed defendant on thirty-six 
months probation, which included serving one year in jail (R. 167-69). 
Defendant timely appealed her conviction (R. 172). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant, Barbara DeHart, helped her boyfriend John Pinder hide from and evade 
police after he murdered two people and blew up their bodies. Unless otherwise stated, the 
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following details are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. 
Kruger, 2000 UT 60, f2, 399 Utah Adv. Rep. 20; State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 351 (Utah 
1996). 
The remains of a human hip socket 
On the night of October 30, 1998, officers waited just outside the Pinder Ranch in 
Duchesne County for a search warrant (R. 210:36). While waiting, Deputy Johnson saw 
what appeared to be the remains of a human hip socket just a few feet from the road (R. 
210:36,43). The officers received the warrant at about 10:00 p.m., but waited until morning 
to enter the ranch (R. 210:37) 
On the ranch, the officers found body parts, "a lot of small pieces," strewn over an 
area of over 300 to 400 square feet (R. 210:37-38, 46-47). Some of the body parts were 
buried under the dirt, some lay on the surface, and some hung off the branches of sage brush 
(R. 210:46-47). 
The largest body part was the upper torso of Rex Tanner, which included his chest 
from about mid-sternum, part of one arm, and his head (R. 210:38-39). The officers also 
found two legs clad in mismatched socks and the remnants of a pair of pants (R. 210:38-39). 
A wrapper from a bag of the explosive compound prell was wrapped around one of the legs 
(R. 210:38-39). Other body parts included a uterus from a postmenopausal woman with part 
of the vaginal tract still attached (R. 210:50). The woman was later identified as June Flood, 
Rex Tanner's girlfriend (R. 210:19, 22-25, 53). 
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The medical examiner determined from Tanner's torso that he had suffered blunt force 
injuries before death and that he had died from multiple gunshot wounds (R. 210:49-50). 
There were not enough body parts to determine the cause of Flood's death (R. 210:49-50). 
The medical examiner did determine, however, that both bodies had been blown up after 
death (R. 210:49-50). 
A cave north of the Pinder ranch house contained a stack of Burn Mix prell sacks, the 
same brand name appearing on the partial prell wrapper stuck to one of the legs (R. 210:40-
41). The numbers on the bags also matched the numbers on the partial wrapper (R. 210:40-
41). Some of the bags had been broken, and fresh prell granules had spilled onto the ground 
(R. 210:41-42). 
Neither Tanner nor Flood had been seen or heard from since Sunday, October 25, 
1998, although Flood had promised to call her friend on Monday, and Tanner was expected 
at his family's home on Wednesday (R. 210:20-21,25,27). On Thursday, a friend checked 
on the pair to discover their house in disarray and their wallphone missing (R. 210:21-24). 
Big Mess 
The previous month, defendant had left Kurt DeHart, her husband of twenty-six years, 
for John Pinder (R. 211:72,104-05,138-39, 204-07). The DeHarts had known Pinder for 
fifteen years; Pinder had once employed both the DeHarts, and he owned a home less than 
a quarter of a mile away from their Cataldo, Idaho home (R. 211:72,138,207-08). Kurt and 
Pinder had been good friends to this point (R. 211:151). 
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On Monday, October 26, 1998, at about 11:30 a.m., defendant called her daughter 
Melissa Cowles from Pinder's Utah ranch (R. 211:75). Defendant was upset because Pinder 
and his ranch hand Filo "had been out all night and. . . she had made a really nice dinner and 
they never showed" (R. 211:75, 220). Defendant suspected that Pinder "was cheating on 
her" (R. 211:75). Defendant abruptly ended the conversation when Pinder drove up (R. 
211:76). 
"Frantic" and "upset," defendant called Melissa a half hour later, saying, "Big mess, 
Missy. Big mess. It's horrible here. I just want to come home" (R. 211:76,93). Defendant 
added that she could not tell Melissa about it "over the phone," but that it was "just horrible" 
(R. 211:76, 93). 
Defendant also called her husband that morning, telling him that "things had happened 
down there" (R. 211:139). She told her husband that he "wouldn't believe it and she was 
really — she sounded scared . . . . " (R. 211:139, 154-55). Defendant also did not tell her 
husband what had happened, but said that she was coming home that day (R. 211:139). 
A calmer defendant called Melissa on Tuesday to say that she and Pinder were 
meeting with his attorneys and that they would be in Cataldo on Friday, October 30, with a 
cage and meat for Pinder's pet lion (R. 211:76-77). Defendant called again that week, but 
Melissa thought her mother was unusually "standoffish" and that "something was bugging 
her" (R. 211:77). 
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Driving Pinder's blue Dodge pickup truck and pulling a horse trailer, defendant and 
Pinder arrived in Cataldo on Halloween morning, Saturday, October 31 (R. 211:77-78,79). 
Defendant's husband allowed them to stay in his home because he had plans to be gone that 
weekend (R. 211:78, 140). Defendant went next door to Melissa's house around 9:00 that 
morning (R. 211:77). Defendant "was pacing back and forth and she said that Filo had been 
arrested. There had been a murder out on John's ranch and that Filo had been arrested and 
that [she and Pinder] may have to go back to Utah for questioning" (R. 211:78). 
Defendant called Melissa's house Sunday morning, November 1 (R. 211:80). 
Defendant "was panicking" (R. 211:80). Defendant told Melissa that Pinder "had told her 
everything, that he admitted to the murders of the people on the ranch, that he admitted to 
killing people on the ranch" (R. 211:80). 
Defendant also called her father that morning (R. 211:300). She told him that Pinder 
"had killed two people and that she was going to be implicated in the crime because she had 
helped him dispose of some of the evidence" (R. 211:301). Defendant said that she and 
Pinder "had dropped some of the bloody clothing and some of the other evidence in small 
towns on the way from Duchesne to northern Idaho" (R. 211:301). Defendant told her father 
that she had cleaned Pinder's truck and that the victims had been shot and then blown up (R. 
211:301). 
Defendant went to Melissa's house at about 10:30 that morning (R. 211:80). She 
repeated that Pinder "had admitted that he had killed the people on the ranch, the ranch hand 
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and his girlfriend," and added that "they had taken the truck to a carwash and that she had 
found bloody hair and scalp, is how she put it, underneath the passenger seat of his truck in 
a bag, and she had thrown it in the garbage" (R. 211:81). 
Defendant also said that she had burned Pinder's bloody clothes and that they had 
thrown the murder weapon into the river (R. 211:82). Defendant commented that Melissa's 
"soon to be step-daddy is a murderer," and that her "mother is a criminal and we're just like 
Bonnie and Clyde, always on the run" (R. 211:82-83, 96). Melissa's husband, Damien, 
overheard this conversation (R. 211:127-35). 
Defendant called Melissa later that afternoon and "[h]er whole story had changed" (R. 
211:83). Defendant now claimed that "Filo and Dave had planted the evidence in [Pinder's] 
truck and that [Pinder] was innocent, and that the reason they had cleaned up the evidence 
was that she didn't want [Pinder] to get in trouble for something he didn't do" (R. 211:83). 
When Melissa asked her mother why she had a different story, defendant replied, "I don't 
know, Miss/' (R. 211:84). Melissa recalled that about a week before the homicides, 
defendant had mentioned that Pinder had "a grudge against Rex Tanner and June Flood" (R. 
211:113). Defendant then confided to Melissa that she had talked Pinder out of 
"throwing his truck over the cliff'and into leaving it at his Cataldo home, while the two 
returned to Utah in defendant's white Toyota 4-Runner (R. 211:84). "That way," explained 
defendant, "they wouldn't get pulled over by the cops as easy" because "[n]obody would 
recognize her 4-Runner as [Pinder's] truck on their way back to Utah" (R. 211:84). 
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Pinder and defendant left Idaho in defendant's 4-Runner that day, Sunday, November 
1 (R. 211:86, 237). They left Pinder's pickup in his driveway, and the horse trailer next to 
defendant's Cataldo home (R. 211:86,141-42). Melissa called police that day and told them 
what she knew (R. 211:84). 
Pinder: "Thanks Kurt.. . . You just signed my fucking death warrant" (R.211:143) 
Defendant called Melissa a few times after she and Pinder left Idaho (R. 211: 84-85). 
Defendant first asked Melissa if she had talked to police (R. 211:85). Melissa lied at first and 
said, "No" (R. 211:85). Her mother responded, "Good. Don't tell them anything" (R. 
211:85). However, on a subsequent call, defendant "went ballistic" when Melissa told her 
that she had in fact talked to police (R. 211:85). Defendant encouraged Melissa to tell police 
that she had "lied, that [she] made up the whole story" (R. 211:85,99). Defendant also asked 
Melissa if police had searched the horse trailer (R. 211:86,99-100). When Melissa said that 
no one had, defendant replied, "Good. Don't let them" (R. 211:87,99-100). 
Defendant's husband returned to his home on Monday, November 2, to find defendant 
and Pinder already gone (R. 211:140). In the spare room closet, Kurt discovered a "bunch 
of rifles" that Pinder had left and a maroon gym bag (R. 211:140). The gym bag contained 
several items, most of them in "baggies" or "sandwich bags" (R. 211:140-41). The items 
included, "people's ID, letters to [Pinder], there was a bag of hair. . . . It appeared to be 
human hair, like somebody had cut somebody's hair and put it in a bag" (R. 211:141,176). 
Kurt also found a dark stocking cap and a t-shirt with what appeared to be blood stains (R. 
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211:140-41). Kurt turned the bag, rifles, and other items over to police (R. 211:141-42).l 
On Tuesday, November 3, defendant called her husband to see if police had come or 
taken anything (R. 211:142). Defendant specifically asked if they had taken the gym bag (R. 
211:142). When Kurt said, "Yes," defendant said to someone else, "They got the bag" (R. 
211:142). Kurt then heard Pinder yell from the background, "Thanks Kurt. Thanks a lot. 
You just signed my fucking death warrant" (R. 211:143, 152). 
KSL Interview 
On Wednesday, November 4, shortly before midnight, Pinder and defendant appeared 
at the KSL television studio so that Pinder could "tell his side of the story, what was going 
on out there" (R. 211:157, 245-46). Defendant sat next to Pinder during the 45-minute 
videotaped interview (R. 211:157). During the interview, defendant claimed that Pinder had 
been with her the entire night of the murders, although police had not yet released the date 
of the murders (R. 211:164,246-47, 272). At trial, defendant was unable to state how she 
knew what night the murders occurred and she finally acknowledged that Pinder was the 
most likely source for that information (R. 211:272-74). A segment at the end of the 
videotape showed Pinder driving defendant away in her white Toyota 4-Runner shortly after 
midnight (R. 211:157-58). 
*DNA testing later revealed that the blood on the t-shirt was Pinder's (R. 211: 175-
76, 183). The hair was also sent out for DNA testing, but the record does not reflect the 
results (R. 211:176, 183). 
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False license plate number 
Less than seven hours later, at 6:48 a.m. on November 5, defendant checked into the 
Virgin River Hotel in Mesquite, Nevada (R. 211:159-60). The registration form reflected 
defendant's correct name and address and that she was driving a white 1997 Toyota 4-
Runner (R. 211:159-160). Although her Toyota carried Idaho license plates, defendant wrote 
on the registration form that her truck had Utah license plates (R. 211:160). Defendant also 
wrote a false license plate number on the form (R. 211:160). 
Defendant wrote on the registration that two persons would be staying in the room (R. 
211:160). The registration clerk remembered and identified defendant, but never saw the 
other person staying in the room (R. 211:160). The room was vacated by the next morning, 
November 6 (R. 211:160). 
Defendant: "For all I know that's dog or elk hair" (R. 211:172). 
Defendant returned alone to her Cataldo home around 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. on November 
7 (R. 211:173-74, 251). Defendant had called about 45 minutes to an hour before arriving 
to discover that Sergeant Wallace Hendricks, a Duchesne County deputy sheriff, was there 
to talk to her (R. 211:173). Sergeant Hendricks had wanted to speak to defendant sooner, but 
did not know how to contact her (R. 211:173-74). Although Pinder had not yet been charged 
or named as a suspect, Sergeant Hendricks had also been trying to contact Pinder (R. 
211:174-75). Sergeant Hendricks had been speaking with Pinder's attorneys during the 
previous week to "try[] to get them to convince [Pinder] to come talk to me or put me in 
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touch with him either by telephone or in person, somehow" (R. 211:175). Hendricks' efforts 
had been unsuccessful to that point (R. 211:171-72, 175). 
When defendant arrived, Sergeant Hendricks "began to tell her the severity of the 
investigation [they] were conducting concerning a homicide in Utah" (R. 211:171). 
Hendricks told defendant about the evidence they were finding and "that people had been 
telling [him] that she was involved" (R. 211:171-72). Hendricks added that they "knew 
about a bag that she had thrown away from under the seat of the truck at the carwash" (R. 
211:171 -72). Defendant nodded her head, and said, "I have four attorneys in Utah telling me 
to tell you for all I know that's dog or elk hair" (R. 211:172). 
Defendant told Hendricks that "she had been driving [Pinder] around," and that "she 
had dropped [Pinder] off in Las Vegas the day before (R. 211:171). Defendant also told 
Hendricks that she had given Pinder her handgun, which she described as a Browning .380 
caliber semiautomatic (R. 211:171). 
Defendant's testimony 
Defendant testified that Pinder was with her the entire night of Sunday, October 25 
(R. 211:218-22). She acknowledged having called Melissa on Monday, October 26, but 
denied having said that "[t]here are horrible things going on down here" (R. 211:223). 
Defendant explained she was unhappy at the time because she and Pinder had had a fight that 
weekend and she had decided that she "didn't like living here . . . didn't like some of the 
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people and [she] was uncomfortable there. . . . [She] wanted to go home" (R. 211:223). 
Defendant denied being aware of the homicides that morning (R. 211:223). 
Defendant stated that she went to Roosevelt for supplies on Tuesday morning (R. 
211:265). As soon as she returned that afternoon, she took lunch and cigarettes to defendant, 
who was working on another part of the ranch (R. 211:264-65). When she arrived, she found 
defendant sitting atop a caterpillar tractor moving dirt (R. 211:266). Defendant denied seeing 
any body parts at the time (R. 211:266). 
According to defendant, she and Pinder stayed in a Heber City motel that night, and 
on Wednesday, Pinder met with his lawyers, "business . . . not criminal," in Salt Lake City 
(R. 211:225). Defendant stated that on Thursday they had a hitch put on Pinder's truck and 
then returned to the ranch to get the horse trailer, which ranch hands had loaded at Pinder's 
instruction (R. 211:225-26). Defendant disclaimed knowing what was in the trailer (R. 
211:253). 
Defendant testified that she and Pinder began driving to Idaho Thursday night and 
they stopped in Tremonton, Utah for the night (R. 211:225-26). Defendant stated that on 
Saturday, Halloween, Pinder's mother called him on his cell phone and told him that police 
had a search warrant and had found two bodies on the ranch (R. 211:227-28,231). Pinder 
then called one of his lawyers to accompany Pinder's father to the ranch (R. 211:229-30). 
After that, Pinder was "on the phone all the time" (R. 211:231). Towards the evening on 
Halloween, one of Pinder's lawyers advised him to return to Utah (R. 211:231). 
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Defendant claimed that this was the first she had heard of the murders and that all of 
her information had come through Pinder (R. 211:229-31,242-43). Defendant testified that 
to this day, she still did not know what night the murders happened (R. 211:230). 
Defendant testified that after they left Cataldo, Pinder was in constant contact with 
his attorneys who told him that he did not have to come in until he was charged (R. 211:237-
239). Defendant acknowledged that she was with Pinder on November 2 when he met with 
attorneys in Salt Lake and that she participated in those discussions (R. 211:237, 242). 
Defendant claimed that the attorneys told them to "stay in touch" and that the attorneys 
would advise them if Pinder became a suspect or if they needed to talk to defendant (R. 
211:238-39). 
Defendant testified that after leaving the KSL television studio, she and Pinder drove 
all night to Nevada (R. 211:247,248,275-76,277). Defendant claimed that the morning of 
November 5, Pinder learned from his lawyers that there was a warrant out for his arrest (R. 
211:250). According to defendant, the lawyers advised the two to separate and defendant to 
return to her home (R. 211:250). Defendant stated that she then dropped Pinder off at a truck 
stop just outside Las Vegas, and that she doubled back to Mesquite where she checked into 
the Virgin River Hotel alone (R. 211:247-50). Defendant explained that she mistakenly 
wrote that two people were staying in the room and the wrong license plate number because 
she was tired and confused from driving all night (R. 211:247-50, 275-77). 
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Defendant denied that she took the truck to a carwash, threw out or burned bloody 
clothes, threw out anything that looked like a scalp, or threw a gun into a river (R. 211:229, 
234-25). Defendant further denied having told her daughter, husband, or father that she had 
done any of these things (R. 211:234-236, 252-53). Defendant also claimed that she never 
spoke with her daughter or husband about not allowing the police to search the horse trailer 
or maroon gym bag and that Pinder never said anything about Kurt signing his death warrant 
(R. 211:241,252-53). Defendant disclaimed having given her gun to Pinder, and could not 
recall telling Sergeant Hendricks that she had done so (R. 211:249). At trial, defendant stated 
that she had given her gun to Pinder's father before they drove to Nevada and that he had 
returned it to defendant two months later (R. 211:249). 
Special Verdict 
With the parties' agreement, the trial court gave the jury a special verdict form which 
asked the jury to specify which of three alternatives it had unanimously agreed on in finding 
defendant guilty of obstructing justice (R. 105-06; R. 211:65). The three alternatives were 
that having the intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, 
conviction, or punishment of another for the crimes of aggravated murder or murder, 1) 
defendant harbored or concealed the offender, 2) defendant provided the offender with a 
weapon, transportation, disguise, or other means for avoiding discovery or apprehension, or 
3) defendant concealed, destroyed, or altered any physical evidence that might aid in the 
discovery, apprehension, or conviction of the offender (R. 105-06). The jury checked the 
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first two alternatives, but left the third one blank (R. 106). A copy of the special verdict form 
is attached as Addendum A. 
Additional relevant facts are included in the argument section. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the corpus delicti 
independent of her extrajudicial admissions. Defendant's statements made prior to and 
during the commission of her crime, however, are not subject to the corpus delicti rule. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was more than sufficient to 
establish the corpus delicti of obstructing justice independent of her few post-crime 
staiements. 
Defendant also argues that the evidence as a whole was insufficient to support her 
conviction for obstructing justice. The record evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 
to the jury verdict, refutes that claim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MAJORITY OF DEFENDANT'S EXTRAJUDICIAL 
STATEMENTS WERE NOT SUBJECT TO THE CORPUS DELICTI 
RULE BECAUSE THEY WERE MADE BEFORE AND DURING THE 
COMMISSION OF HER CRIME; SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
INDEPENDENT OF DEFENDANT'S POST-CRIME ADMISSIONS 
ESTABLISHED THE CORPUS DELICTI 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish the corpus delicti of 
her crime independent of her many statements to her daughter, husband, father, and police. 
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Brief of \ppellanf *'"Br \pit. . ,if *. . . ^tramdicial statements, 
however., were maue ; <:\ . -K i mssion ot .icr wrime and therefore may be 
vidence was sufficient to estaon^n UK 
delicti independent of the few post-crime statements defendant made. 
A. The corpus delicti rule applies om st-crime admissions. 
" \n admission or a coiilrssi.. n ii, illn .ul ,omc independent corroborative evidence of* 
the corpus ilil ii111 «, IIIII««I II-HK? support a guilty verdici M ^late \ Knoefler, 3b ^  v jd i ' \ 
1 h (l)77); accord State v Hansen, H57 P,2d 978. M ^ 11 'Lih I'W \ i, V/;i/V • Wridcrn. 
6Utah2d372,3731314P.2d353,3S4(l l^ |i tl.ru- » ' , -| i,< ifHictr |n-rall> means "the 
body of the crime," but as ""Usui in regjul In proof ol crime, it refers only to evidence that 
a crime h * State v. Cazier, 521 P,2d 554, 5*5 (Utah i v -
•, "i-'h (hf State cannot convict a defendant on her admissions or contest m ,il< n« , v m nni,;i 
also present independent evidence that a crime wai; .'MIIUIUIK-J ,V; uv v Ferrv, 2 Utah id 
371,275 P.2d 1 ^ mde "the finding of the body of the person 
murdere nse burned, or evidence of an injury or violation of person or 
pn iperty," Cazier, 521 P.2d ai V- •> 
"The [corpus delicti] rule is designed i,s A vilcgu.tfii igiiinst convicting the innocent 
on the strength of false con Jessie us jhnson, 821 P.2d U5i\ \ lf>J i !tah io<m. 
Nt'icttiieless, ii' ,„i joes not require the State to provide independent evidence - e 
elements of a crime or that the defendant is the person who commilk <J the Cazier, 
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521 P.2dat555. See also State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39,41-42 (Utah 1987) (finding corpus 
delicti of rape independently proven without regard to proof of nonmarriage, an essential 
element of rape at that time); see also Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162 (state not required to show 
independent evidence that "accused was the guilty agent"); Knoefler, 563 P.2d at 176 (same). 
Rather, the independent evidence must show only two things: 1) "[t]hat a wrong, an injury, 
or a damage has been done," and 2) "that such was effected by a criminal agency, i.e., 
without right or by unlawful means." Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
The corpus delicti may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183, 
1188 (Utah App. 1994); Provo City Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437, 441 (Utah App. 1993); 
State v. Hansen, 857 P.2d 978,980 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Cooley, 603 P.2d 800,801-02 
(Utah 1979); see State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061,1062-63 (Utah 1977) (inferring corpus 
delicti of automobile homicide from circumstances of accident), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1979). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence 
establishing the corpus delicti, the evidence and reasonable inferences must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the State's case or the verdict. State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515, 517 
(Utah 1980). In Utah, proof of the corpus delicti must be by clear and convincing evidence. 
Johnson, 821 P.2dat 1163. 
18 
. t\-v4 - -' acknowledges in her brief, our supreme court has expressly held that the 
corpus delicii :..__ .:-c. not ^IV:J statements m;i.i<* Hon-re %>r during the crime's 
commission," but applies only ^  ^-rijudicial post-crime admissions, Junnson, 821 P.2d at 
1162 63. I his is because statements 
mi 1111 i" i»111111 n [ < 111 v I i\f the inhererit weaknesses of confessions or admissions after the fact' 
and, therefore, the corpus delicti doctrine's requirement of corroboration [is] not necessary." 
Id. v M62 {quoting Warszower v United States, **1? TTS. 342, 347, 61 S Ct «<H >«n* 
(194i ..•_.< . . . . 
dim*3 \ ' ' ' \ • * ?-'^ .'-M'U2> delicti, o t e tu. ai 
1164 (using pre-crime admission in determining that corpus delicti had been pro\ ed 
independent of defendant's post-crime admissions).2 
B 1 he corpus delicti rule applies only to defendant's post-crime statements 
to police and not to her pre-crime and contemporaneous statements to her 
daughter. 
Defendant s statements after she and Pinder arrived in Idaho. Defendant does not 
claim that the corpus delicti rule applies to any of her telephone statements to her daughter 
"Defendant correctly points out that the corpus delicti rule arises in two contexts: 
1) as a foundational requirement for the admission of a defendant's post-crime admission 
or confession, e.g., Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1160-62, and 2) as a post-trial review to 
determine whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the corpus delicti 
independent of the accused's admissions, e.g, State v. Hansen, 557 P.2d 978 (Utah App. 
1993). Defendant does not challenge on appeal, nor did she below, the admissibility of 
any of her statements She argues only that the evidence independent of her admissions 
was insufficient to establish the corpus delicti. Br. Aplt 8 9 
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or husband before she and Pinder arrived in Idaho for the Halloween weekend. Br. Aplt. 12-
13. She does, however, argue that the rule should apply to the following statements she made 
to her daughter after she arrived in Idaho: 
1. Defendant's statement on October 30, 1998, that Filo Ruiz had been 
arrested for murder and that she and Pinder may have to return to Utah for 
questioning (R. 211:78). 
2. Defendant's statement on November 1, 1998, that Pinder had told her that 
he had admitted to committing the two murders on his ranch (R. 211:80). 
3. Defendant's statements that she had helped Pinder clean his truck of blood, 
hair, something that looked like a scalp, and that she had burned bloody 
clothes and helped dispose of the murder weapon (R. 211:81-82). 
Br. Aplt. 13-14. 
The first two statements were made before the commission of the offense under the 
two alternatives specifically found by the jury's special verdict: 1) harboring or concealing 
the offender and 2) providing the offender with transportation or a weapon (R. 105-06). The 
third statement, which relates to concealing or destroying evidence, was arguably made after 
defendant completed that alternative (R. 106). However, because the jury did not find that 
defendant concealed or destroyed evidence, it clearly did not convict her based on those 
statements alone (R. 106). Therefore, the State will only address the applicability of the rule 
to the first two statements. Moreover, because the evidence independent of the third 
statement was more than sufficient to support the corpus delicti of the two alternatives found 
by the jury, this brief will not use the third statement in analyzing the evidence. 
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1
 •<:••*- ^hnically, under Johnson, "these statements would not 
be subject to the corpus delicti because they could be construed as being made dunr.a 
the commission of the offense " n r *r l f 1 ^  She argues that the rule should ne\ ertuc^c -» 
apply to these statements because t!\ . . .. r • dulils .iim! llinrtoir nil \ Hlliiii Itn; nnhc\ nt 
I n u.img lU'iis-jiiiiM lijiscil snick nn Minv admissions or confessions. Br. Aplt. 14-15. l o 
support this claim, defendant alleges that her daughter was angry at her for leaving her 
husband and therefore had a general motive to lie about the statements, thai 
making the statements -* . ,i, and th.. , • . "^ -• -
testiru- * that def ^ .\< r h-icl i MIII ealed or destroyed evidence. Br. 
The State disputes that Melissa's report of her mother's statements lacks credibility. 
While Melissa may have been unhappy about hei ri fled that 
'.In: I : \ a i liei m<: EIICI, .mini Ii nth In I'm ,„(iiil (IHaicliiifs testimony reflected a relatively close 
relationship until the murders (R. 211.88-8!), 103-06). Defendant attended the birth of 
Melissa's second child, even though this occurred after she had left her husband lur Finder, 
but before the murders (R. i. I l I I I \ U'w ii«i s li I Hi i nitinnJciiii mild Pinder mruirii 
Melissa li lltinr lil.ihn homr Ini IIIIIIIIM (K "!11:751 Defendant called Melissa nearly ever> 
day after she went to stay with Pinder in Utah (R. 21.1:74). Defendant often cared for her 
first grandchild, and continued to care for her grandchildren even after she had been I'huijjeU 
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(R. 211:205-06, 213). Thus, while Melissa may have had a general motive to lie, she also 
had very good reasons for not wanting to falsely accuse her mother. 
Melissa also reported her mother's statements as soon as she left Idaho with Pinder 
(R. 211:84). The contemporaneousness of the report, coupled with her concern that her 
mother was driving around with a professed murderer (R. 211:84-85), only add to the 
credibility of Melissa's testimony about her mother's statements. The fact that the jury did 
not unanimously find that defendant concealed or destroyed evidence does not undercut the 
statements' reliability. As the "sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and of the 
weight of the testimony," a jury has the prerogative to "believe or disbelieve, accept or reject, 
the whole or a part of the testimony of any witness." State v. Morris, 40 Utah 431, 122 P. 
380,383-84 (1912); accord State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610,612 (Utah 1986), habeas corpus 
granted on other grounds by 830 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1992). 
In any event, the rule adopted in Johnson controls this case. Johnson unequivocally 
and unambiguously held that "statements made prior to or during the commission of a crime" 
are not subject to the corpus delicti rule. Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162-63. The court explained 
that "[w]hatever the rule as to the need for caution in admitting inculpatory statements made 
after the crime, there seems to be little need for extraordinary protective measures for 
statements made before or during the crime's commission." Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162-63. 
This is because statements made before or during a crime are not admissions or confessions. 
Indeed, in some instances, such statements may actually constitute part of the actus reas or 
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•' M • xet v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 61 S.Ct. 603-1941, - i 
prosecution for using passport secured hy false statements, the defendant's pre-crime fal-v 
statements could be used to help prove the corpus delicti). 
I he Johnson conn mane no \\w\\ warn ih i mv i uqinon MI.H tidaidiini nnw IIULM1 «,I 
MIMI'I1'. IT defendant« il»M, no authority t* »r tin* proposition that her pre-crime statements are 
subject to the corpus delicti rule merely because she denies having made the statements and 
believes that her daughter's testimony lacked credibility She also presents no compelling 
reason lot this court to depart i •.. ><. -
111is I "null I. hi ' . v cum, uiciciuie, must conclude that the statements 
defendant made to her daughter and other family members before leaving Idaho r 
November 1 may be used in determining whether the corpus delicti was established. 
Dejendat, «statements to Sergeantn* o '\Hn iviuimnjj, In Malii »» Nnvrinhn 
* r t - k •* • e had been driving around with Pinder and 
that she had left him in Las Vegas the day before (R. - - Defendant also told 
Hendricks that she had given Pinder her .380 Browning semiautomatic handgun 
111 I I " 11 Because these admis:i 
mi: 11; i "ii" in, in delicti must he established independent of them. See Johnson, 821 P.2dat 1163. 
The issue, therefore, is whether the other evidence at trial, including defendant's 
statements to her daughter, husband, and father, before and during tne . . 
concealed defendant, proved ly deal and v on v Hieing, n. HICJK.V 
a damage [had] been done" and that the wrong had been "effected by a criminal agency." 
Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162. As explained below, it did. 
C. Evidence independent of defendant's post-crime statements supported the 
corpus delicti by clear and convincing evidence. 
As stated, defendant was convicted of obstructing justice under two alternative 
theories, both unanimously found by the jury. The elements specifically found by the jury 
were those required under the statute: 1) that defendant knew that Pinder had committed 
aggravated murder or murder; 2) that defendant had the intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the 
discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of Pinder for murder, and 
having that intent 3) defendant harbored or concealed Pinder, and 4) defendant provided 
Pinder with a weapon, transportation, disguise, or other means for avoiding discovery or 
apprehension (R. 105-06). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (1999). Under the statute a 
finding of either (3) or (4) in conjunction with the other elements was sufficient to convict 
defendant of obstructing justice. Id. Thus, for defendant's conviction to stand, independent 
evidence must support the corpus delicti of either (3) or (4), but not both. 
Although the corpus delicti rule does not require independent proof of every element, 
see Cazier, 521 P.2d at 555, the evidence in this case does support each element independent 
of defendant's post-crime statements. This brief will therefore address the evidence 
according to each element. 
Defendant knew Pinder had committed murder. Defendant called Melissa on 
Monday, October 26, and told her that Pinder and Ruiz had been gone all night (R. 211:75, 
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i »" lull hm11 1.111• i 111("i" I'i(1 HIM iPnirno11, ,i tr intic defendant called again to say there 
was a "big mess" (R. 211:76, 93). 1 he timing of these calls coincided with the victims' 
disappearance and the jury could have reasonably inferred thai iiu» ir> A IKH defendant first 
became aware that Pinder was involved. Inanv event,, ileU'iul.ml •, lll.itn pm i nmi' sliilnnrnl'i 
il I In III! *a mil hr i I ill in lliil rim In (i M I n i i i t r ssn l the murders to her provided conclusive 
proof of this element (R. 211:80, 300j . 1'hai defendant 'knew Pinder had committed the 
murders was furthi: supported by Pinder 's yelling at Kurt DeHart in her presence that Kurt 
hail i- i ;•.•- us. ^ i . aa t • turning uie >^\L \<_ ovu I |i< In i t'R '" I I I I " J \ I "'i 
I • inal < • * - n t e rvW efendant gave Pinder an alibi for the 
night of the murders even though that information had not yet been publicized (R 211:164, 
246-47,2 72-74) Defendant acknowledged at trial that Pinder was the most likely source for 
knowing which night the murders occurred (l(, 1II1 
I tken toui'lhiM llm* I n g o i n g i/videnn1 establish • rand convincing evidence 
that defendant knew Pinder had committed the murders. 
Defendant intended to hinder, prevent\ or delay Pinder 9s discovery or apprehension, 
™
f
 erroneously asserts that her telephone call--, MM 111 .i< rl 1111 lulu i i niipi IMI i 11 n ^ i U 
Mnder with the intent to hinder or delay his 
apprehension or discovery Bi Aplt. 16-19. To the contrary, the record contains ample 
evidence of defendant's intent, Defendant testified that on Halloween evening one of 
Finder's lawyers advised him to i etui n In I Idih I U J1*,! 1 J" \ I lusl In Inn h .n iiiii1 InLtho iII11 
Pinder, defendant told her daughter that they were going to drive to Utah in defendant's truck 
because the police would be less likely to stop them than if they were in Pinder's truck (R. 
211:84).3 The jury could reasonably infer from defendant's testimony and this statement that 
defendant knew that police were looking for Pinder and wanted to question him, but that 
defendant and Pinder intended to delay any meeting. 
Defendant claims that Sergeant Hendricks' testimony that he was negotiating with 
Pinder's lawyers to meet with Pinder negates any intent on her part to hinder or delay. Br. 
Aplt. 16. The opposite is true. Hendricks testified that his discussions with Pinder's lawyers, 
was "[n]ot so much negotiating terms in which he may come talk to me, I was trying to get 
them to convince [Pinder] to come talk to me or put me in touch with him either by telephone 
or in person, somehow" (R. 211:175). Defendant testified that she met with Pinder and his 
lawyers in Salt Lake City on November 2,1998 (R. 211:237,242). She then testified that 
between that day and November 4, the day of the KSL interview, they stayed in an Ogden 
motel and that Pinder called his attorneys three or four times a day (R. 211:242). Defendant 
claimed they were "just waiting to see what happens" (R. 211:242). Given the foregoing, it 
is difficult to believe that defendant was not aware that police were looking for Pinder. 
defendant's brief does not specify this statement as falling under the corpus 
delicti rule. The rule clearly does not apply to this statement, however, because it was 
made before or during the commission of defendant's crime. Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162-
63. Defendant's testimony that Pinder's attorney advised him to return to Utah is also not 
covered by the corpus delicti rule because the rule applies only to extrajudicial statements. 
See Weldon, 6 Utah 2d at 373, 314 P.2d at 354. 
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utn«\ she called 
Melissa several times, asking whether the police had come and what they had taken, but 
never telling Melissa where she was and how Melissa could contact her (R. 211:84-87) Her 
llll'H" hmlei ranch oi going dun 111 lopnhn1, dtieinliiiilli .HI ill Ihiimln hi I, in! h'.dcn, ^nveaK SL 
ideotaped interview in the middle of the night, and then immediately fled to Nevada where 
defendant gave a false license plate number on the motel registration card All this evidence 
evinces defendant's knowledge that police were .ooKihg ,.; . .,, :. :...: . : 
Pindei i di*UAci v «i i I ii|»|nvIn nsion. 
Defendant h \rhared or concealed defendant. Defendant harbored and concealed 
defendant by providing him with her truck so that they would not be stopped, and by driving 
Pinder to Nevada where she used a false license plate number to register (K, J! 11 K4, ) y) • / ,»i 11 
:^  tendani i..- *ablished mdependrnllv ill ll'iin 
I n us I HI;' in i ini • in Imission to Hendrick • • ! * • defendant testified that they drove to Nc ^ada in 
her 4-Runner and that she dropped Pinder off at a truck stop just outside Las Vegas (R 
211::: 247-49). Second, the State introduced evidence that defendant had registered hensti 1 .in m I 
mount pei son in vim Mpjild" in in in di'il i«i' iii'i '• I though defendant claims that she 
Iroppod Pinder offbefore she registered in Mesquite, the jury could have reasonably inferred 
that it would have been impossible for her to have left the KSL interview in Salt I ake after 
midnight, drive past Mesquite to Las Vegas, and then return,, to Mesqui 
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before 7:00 a.m. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to show that Pinder was with 
defendant when she registered in Mesquite and that she helped to conceal him by writing a 
false license plate number on the registration card. 
By establishing this final element of obstructing justice, the State independently 
proved the corpus delicti. However, as explained below, the State also proved the corpus 
delicti of the second alternative. 
Defendant provided Pinder with transportation or a weapon. The evidence was 
uncontroverted that defendant provided Pinder with transportation when she let him use her 
truck to leave Idaho. Defendant testified that they took her truck (R. 211:271). The KSL 
videotape showed defendant and Pinder driving away in her truck (R. 211:157-58). The 
registration card at the Mesquite motel stated that defendant was driving a white Toyota 4-
Runner, although it reflected a false license plate number and state (R. 211:159-60). Coupled 
with the intent to hinder or delay Pinder's apprehension, this evidence amply proved the 
corpus delicti of this, alternative. 
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the corpus delicti of 
obstructing justice by giving the offender a gun. Because the evidence overwhelmingly 
proves that defendant obstructed justice by providing Pinder with transportation, this Court 
need not address this claim. Evidence that defendant gave Pinder a gun is mere surplusage. 
In any event, the evidence did sufficiently corroborate defendant's admission to 
Sergeant Hendricks that she gave her gun to Pinder. First, defendant admitted at trial, and 
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1 lei dai igl: ltei ai id I: 1/ lsbai id testified , tl lat si le 01 ( ned a 380 Brow riing automatic handgun at 
the time in question (R. 211:88, 144, 249, 278). Defendant argues that the independent 
evidence fails on this point because there was never any evidence that Pinder possessed the 
gun at the time he was apprehended Br ,'\pli I ' IN \llhnmj,h liieie r- iu> dun 1 rs nk in < 
11 llir. piiint, Iherr r. < in 111nsl.111l1.il rudenrr Vl ln.il, 4'fendanl testified that she did not 
give the gun to Pinder, but that she gave it to Pinder's father, who lives in Park City, before 
they drove to Nevada (R. 211:210, 217 249, 25 M Defendant claimed that Finder's father 
returned the gun to her two months I. • •*>ul«I have ivasonahly 
belie vd thai di il was Ivmv, when ' thatshe j^im lo Finder'sfathei 
According to defendant's testimony, there would have been no time for her to give the gun 
to Pinder's father because, as defendant acknowledged, they drove directly from KSI to 
Mesquite ^ - ~* «• urv con1 ^e reasonao 
defen ..-h.r 
took a detour to Park City. Since Pinder's father could not have had the gun, and defendant 
conceded at trial that the gun was out of her possession during that time, the jury could have 
reasonably inferred that defendant had in fact given the gun lo I uuki 
>ti: m\ M led siilt"I\ iiiiiii hiM posl nnne statements. Rather,the 
g t a t e prociuced more than ample evidence to pro\ e the corpus delicti of her crime 
independent of those statements. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE 
Defendant next claims that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, and as shown above, the evidence was more than sufficient 
to support a conviction for obstructing justice. 
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court 
views "'the evidence and all inferences which may be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury.'" State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,343 (Utah 1997) (quoting 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,444 (Utah 1983)); State in the interest of IFX, 803 P.2d 1254, 
1255 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). This Court "will upset the 
jury verdict 'only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he . . . was convicted.'" State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 
1113,1117 (Utah App. 1995) (citing State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470,472 (Utah App. 1991)). 
The Court will not weigh conflicting evidence, substitute its own judgment on the credibility 
of the witnesses for that of the jury, or reverse merely because there is contradictory evidence 
or conflicting inferences. State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19,22 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Sherard, 
818 P.2d 554,557 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). Accord State 




 ' * . • cot p 
I.C., supra, then- .-.x sufficient credible evidence, including defendants post-cnn.c 
statements, from which the jury could conclude that defendant knew that Pinder had, 
committed two murders on his ranch and that w it! 1 tl le intent to delay 01 1 rindei Pindei 's 
i p p i c h c n s i n n Jim II I li in lulu! ii'ii II in i nin i .ill i l I 'mdc i .nnl in ' I p u n min i I "it in I  HI ( i i l l l l i 
transportation and or a weapon. 
Defendant suggests that the evidence did not show that she intended to hinder Pinder's 
apprehension because as soon as they learned he Iliad been t Iiaigetl with the murders, she 
dinppcd him nil iiiiiil iiiliiiiiieiil ill lil iliMi Hi \|ilt Vi } '" I tin cKtentth.it defendant 
that she ceased to help Pinder as soon as she discovered that he was a criminal, the evide^~~ 
refutes that claim \ s explained in Point I, supra, the evidence overwhelmingly suppoi: ted 
the conclusion that defendant knew Pinder had committed the murders while they were still 
IL 
To the extent that defendant argues that she could not be guilty because defendant had 
not yet been named a suspect or charged, she misapprehends the elements of obstructing 
justice Obstructing justice does not require that the of tender be a named suspect or actually 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306. It requires only that the defendant knou s^: :iie offender 
committed a crime and that the defendant harbor or conceal the offender w itli the intent to 
hinder or delay apprehension. I < J" CI s ai 1> , the statute applies to those situations a here,, as 
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here, the defendant, knowing that a crime has been committed, assists the offender who has 
not yet been charged to evade or delay capture by hiding him or helping him leave the 
jurisdiction. The fact that the offender has not yet been named a suspect or charged does not 
change the nature of obstructing justice. 
Here, as already demonstrated, the evidence was compelling that defendant knew that 
Pinder had committed aggravated murder or murder and that she harbored and concealed him 
and provided him transportation for the purpose of delaying or hindering his apprehension. 
Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm defendant' s 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this P^ day of /ItMU^ 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
.AURA B. DUPAIX 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARBARA J. DEHART, 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Criminal No. 981800119 
If you find the defendant, Barbara J. DeHart, GUILTY, you must fill out this Special 
Verdict form. If you find the defendant NOT GUILTY, you do not need to fill out this Special 
Verdict form. 
We, the Jury impaneled in the above entitled case, find the defendant, Barbara J. DeHart, 
GUILTY of Obstructing Justice, as charged in the First Amended Information. In arriving at 
our GUILTY verdict, we unanimously agree: 
1. That in the time period from on or about October 25, 1998, through November 7, 
1998; 
2. The defendant, Barbara J. DeHart, knew that another had committed either Aggravated 
Murder or Murder in Duchesne County, State of Utah; and 
3. The defendant, Barbara J. DeHart, had the intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the 
discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the crimes 
of either Aggravated Murder or Murder; AND 
4. Please select one or more of the following as applicable: 
_ ^ _ A . In arriving at our GUILTY verdict, we unanimously agree that the 
Defendant Barbara J. DeHart HARBORED OR CONCEALED 
THE OFFENDER. 
B. In arriving at our GUILTY verdict, we unanimously agree that the 
Defendant Barbara J. DeHart PROVIDED THE OFFENDER 
WITH A WEAPON, TRANSPORTATION, DISGUISE, OR 
OTHER MEANS FOR AVOIDING DISCOVERY OR 
APPREHENSION. 
C. In arriving at our GUILTY verdict, we unanimously agree that the 
Defendant Barbara J. DeHart CONCEALED, DESTROYED, OR 
ALTERED ANY PHYSICAL EVIDENCE THAT MIGHT AID 
IN THE DISCOVERY, APPREHENSION, OR CONVICTION 
OF THE PERSON. 
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